Resolution 1071 of 6 August replaces Milan's 2013 guidelines on privately delivered public infrastructure. The method for quantifying the offset changes, and with it the economics of schemes built under an implementation plan.
On 6 August 2026 Milan's city cabinet approved, through resolution 1071, new guidelines for the delivery of public infrastructure, services and facilities by private developers. They replace a text that had stood for thirteen years, resolution 1117 of 2013, and apply to planning and building procedures whose agreement is signed after that date. The formal update covers the public contracts code, D.Lgs. 36/2023 and its corrective decree, together with amendments made in the meantime to D.P.R. 380/2001 and Lombardy's regional law 12/2005.
The twelve per cent that is gone
The change with the largest effect on project economics sits in a single line. In determining the amount admitted as an offset against development charges, the 12% reduction on the estimated value of the works, net of safety costs, has been removed.
That reduction had a clear rationale. The city assumed a private operator would build below the reference price list, and therefore recognised a flat-rate discounted amount. The developer, in turn, kept any further saving against the estimate. The balance was crude but stable, and for thirteen years it entered the arithmetic of every Milan scheme built under an implementation plan.
The new guidelines move the criterion from lump sum to actual cost. The recognised amount rises, since the deduction disappears, but if the construction cost verified at final inspection falls below the resources due, the developer pays the difference. The margin on delivering the public works, previously retained by the operator, goes to zero.
Design in two stages
The second change concerns the technical route. Design now runs on two levels in line with D.Lgs. 36/2023, a technical and economic feasibility project and a detailed design, built on an outline scheme mirroring the simplified feasibility document used for project finance proposals.
Once verified by an accredited body, validated by the responsible officer and approved by the cabinet, the feasibility project constitutes a building title under article 7, paragraph 1, letter c of D.P.R. 380/2001. The public works therefore acquire their own permitting track, separate from the private one. The text also allows the feasibility project to be filed after the agreement is approved, where the works are identified later or the private permit is close to completion.
Who is responsible, and who inspects
The former single officer for infrastructure delivery gives way to two roles: a planning procedure officer for plans and programmes, and a building procedure officer for conventioned permits and other titles requiring an agreement or unilateral undertaking. Both coordinate the technical and economic review, held in a services conference, and supervise delivery.
Final inspection passes primarily to the city, using its own staff or an in-house company. Costs remain with the developer.
Obligations on financial traceability, anti-mafia checks, transparency and workplace safety are reinforced along the contracting and subcontracting chain.
What this does to residual land value
Anyone appraising a Milan site now works with a different cost function. The amount admitted as an offset rises by roughly twelve points, which lightens the cash outlay for development charges. In the same move the margin many operators embedded in the public portion of the scheme disappears, and a balancing payment after inspection appears.
The net effect depends on the scheme. Where works are standard and price lists realistic, the twelve per cent gain outweighs the lost margin. Where works are complex, or the operator had above-average delivery capacity, the arithmetic worsens.
The moment at which cost becomes fixed also shifts. Tying the amount to inspected actual cost moves uncertainty downstream on an item that, in multi-year schemes, used to be settled in the agreement and stay there. Trade associations raised that objection against the 2013 framework, and the revision does not resolve it.
The guidelines arrive after three years in which Milan planning practice has been marked by investigations and seizures, and the chapter on anti-mafia controls and traceability reads accordingly. The weight of the text, however, lies in the figures. A scheme carrying ten million of offset works now sees an additional 1.2 million recognised, and loses any reward for delivery efficiency. How that number is arrived at matters as much as the number.